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MIGRATION-RELATED IDENTITY FRAUD
Carolus Grutters 
Karin Zwaan*
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The Dutch government in 2002 expressed its intention to fight fraud in all its 
appearances. This was also formulated in a policy document of 2003 propos­
ing a more coherent and consistent way to fight, control and prevent fraud.1 
Initially, this policy focused on fraud within financial and economic contexts.
The current administration shifted its focus also to other domains, such as 
migrants and migration policy.2 The Ministry of Justice suggested that the cur­
rent frequency of migration-related fraud in The Netherlands in combination 
with publicity could undermine public support for the government’s immigration 
policy. As a result, the A CV Z was asked for an advice on policies to prevent 
migration-related fraud.
In order to do so, not only the situation in The Netherlands but also in other 
countries had to be examined. This report focuses on the latter: the state of 
affairs on migration-related fraud in a number of countries outside The Nether­
lands.
1.1 Request
The initial request of the A CV Z indicated a preliminary study of document and 
identity fraud within the context of admission and residence of aliens. In order 
to be able to evaluate possible policy options for the Dutch situation, a com­
parative research was indicated to map current practices and regulation in a 
number of countries.
Subsequently, three questions were formulated:
- W hat definitions are used to describe the phenomenon of migration- 
related fraud?
- Are there any data available on size and types of migration-related 
fraud?
- W hat measures are implemented to fight migration-related fraud?
* c.grutters@jur.ru.nl; k.zwaan@jur.ru.nl.
1 TK, 17050, nr. 234 and further elaborated in nr. 25 0  (Dutch House of Representatives, 
parliamentary papers).
2 The Stockholm Programme, presented in 2 0 09  by the presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, shows a similar shift to underline border control as a key element.
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The ratio of these questions is that it has to be clear in the first place what the 
meaning is of migration-related fraud in the different countries under investiga­
tion. Subsequently, it has to be investigated whether there are data available 
on these types of fraud. And if so, the additional question arises what the scale 
is of these types of fraud and whether it is perceived as a problem. Finally it is 
useful to know whether certain measures in other countries have been imple­
mented to fight these problems and whether something can be said about the 
effectiveness of these policies.
1.2 Method
Considering the limited amount of time available (AV2 months), the research 
consisted of a questionnaire in combination with a literature study. The ques­
tionnaire had to reveal the actual state of affairs, whereas the literature study 
could clarify the terminology.
The idea was to send this questionnaire to academic experts in a number 
of countries representing ‘new’ as well as ‘old’ member states of the European 
Union (EU) and other countries outside the EU. Their answers to this question­
naire could then be compared. Some questions in the questionnaire were inten­
tionally formulated in an open way, inviting the respondents to elaborate on 
certain issues. Afterwards, all respondents were also approached over the tel­
ephone or by email asking them to go into more detail.
The selection of countries for this comparative study was based on a divi­
sion in four categories:
neighbouring countries (i.e. of The Netherlands); 
non-neighbouring old-EU countries; 
non-neighbouring new-EU countries; and 
non-EU countries.
The first category underlines the importance of land border crossings between 
neighbouring countries and the mutual influence of national policies on m igra­
tion. The subsequent criterion is based on the idea that member states that re­
cently joined the EU differ from ‘older’ member states on relevant aspects, such 
as the organizational infrastructure and applicable legislation. The last catego­
ry implies the need for other, non-European insights on the subject based on the 
assumption that migration as such and hence migration-related fraud is not a 
European but a global issue.
As a result, the following countries were selected: Belgium and Germany 
(neighbouring countries), France, the United Kingdom and Sweden (non­
neighbouring ‘old’ EU-member states), Bulgaria and the Czech Republic (non­
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neighbouring ‘new’ EU-member states) and Australia and Canada (represent­
ing non-EU states).3
The European Commission (EC) completed this list. Although the EC is not a 
nation itself, it has the power of formulating regulations and directives that, 
ultimately, will have to be implemented in national legislation of the EU mem­
ber states. Therefore, any intention at EC level to prepare migration-related 
fraud regulations had to be taken into account.
1.3 O verview
This preliminary study contains successively an investigation of the applicable 
terminology (chapter 2) and a description of the state of affairs in a selection 
of countries, the results of our questionnaire and an analysis of our findings 
(chapter 3). Chapter 4 concludes this study with our main findings and recom­
mendations.
Before elaborating the findings of our research we do want to express our 
gratitude to all the officials who were willing to present us with answers on our 
questions. W e would like to extend a special word of thanks to three of our 
colleagues at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (IC- 
MPD) who were invaluable both in relaying us to specific agencies in a number 
of countries and providing us with detailed information on issues we otherwise 
would have missed: mr. Edward Geelen, mr. Albert Kraler and mrs. N adya Di­
mitrova.
____________________________ Nijmegen Migration Law W orking Papers Series: 201 0/01
3 The limited amount of time availab le  implied that we had to make a selection of coun­
tries that represented the different above-mentioned different four categories.
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CHAPTER 2 TERMINOLOGY
2.1 Starting point
The first research question aims at exploring the used terminology of the phe­
nomenon under study: ‘migration-related fraud’. W hat kind of description is 
used and to what kind of actions do they refer. The purpose hereof lies in the 
confinement of both terms migration and fraud.
2.1.1 Migration
Migration, as far as human migration is concerned, refers to the movement of 
people from one area to another. Within the context of this research it implies 
cross border movements from one country to another: from one jurisdiction to 
another. In general, two distinctions are made within the context of migration. 
First, a distinction is made between voluntary and involuntary migration. The 
latter includes e.g. asylum, the slave trade, trafficking in human beings and 
ethnic cleansing. This distinction refers to the extent that migration is based on a 
well-made decision of the migrant. This distinction however, between voluntary 
and involuntary (or forced) migration is not very sharp and depends on an as­
sessment of social, economical and political circumstances. More recently, also 
climatic changes are said to be responsible for another form of involuntary mi­
gration: the phenomenon of ‘climate refugees’.
A  second distinction towards migration refers to the way in which the mi­
gration takes place. This qualification indicates or describes whether a certain 
procedure is followed or not. From that point of view a terminology of irregu­
lar versus regular migration or legal versus illegal migration is used. Although 
both dichotomies are used apparently having similar meanings, it does make a 
difference whether a term as ‘irregular migration’ is used or ‘illegal migration’. 
The former implies a fairly neutral terminology whereas the latter stigmatises 
migration as being related to crime subsequently implicating that migrants are 
related to criminals.4 A  similar issue arises when speaking of guest workers, 
immigrants or settlers. Thus, it has to be underlined that the use of language 
implies a political choice to the image that the user would like to project.5
2.1.2 Fraud
The other relevant term, fraud, can indicate all kinds of dishonest behaviour 
varying from credit card fraud to deception by hackers, false advertising, tax
4 Commissioner for Human Rights (2010) refers to Resolution 1509(2006) of the Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembley preferring the term ‘irregular migrant’.
5 Commissioner for Human Rights 2 0 10, Cholewinski 2 0 0 7 , Guild & Minderhoud 2 0 06  and 
Lee 2005.
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evasion, marriage fraud, scams, hoaxes or journalistic scandals such as p lag ia ­
rism and fabrication. In our questionnaire we asked for available data on 
‘document and identity fraud in the area of immigration’. This type of fraud 
was referred to as: ‘to intentionally commit fraud with a document or with (ex­
isting or fictitious) identifying data, aiming at the attainment of an advantage 
or the reduction of a disadvantage within the context of the application for (or 
renewal of) a residence permit and related rights and facilities’. It was also 
explained that ‘residence permit’ within this context meant: ‘any document, in­
cluding visa that allows an alien to enter or stay in a country for a certain peri­
od of time or indefinite’.
2.1.3 Initial description
The aforementioned description of ‘document and identity fraud in the area of 
migration’ is not an accurate definition of the phenomenon under study. It was 
merely used in order to cover as much variations of fraudulent acts this study 
focuses on as possible. As will be pointed out in the next paragraph, this also 
had to do with the situation that all kinds of different definitions were used. A 
second reason for the usage of this description was that it was used in other 
preliminary studies related to this one at the request of the ACVZ. This, howev­
er, illustrates the problem in this area: a lack of explicit commonly accepted 
definitions. Terms as ‘fraud’, ‘document fraud’, ‘identity fraud’, ‘identity theft’ 
and ‘identity-related crime’, to name a few, are used with different sometimes 
overlapping meanings within different legal contexts.6 Starting point is there­
fore not one fixed clear term but a collection of expressions that refer to cer­
tain intended activities that are labelled as deceiving and are of crucial im­
portance for the selection process of individuals intrinsic to the movement of 
persons across international borders.
2.2 Related research on term inology
The available literature focuses on concepts like ‘identity’, ‘migration’, ‘fraud’ or 
‘identity fraud’. However, we did not come across any literature combining all 
these terms in one distinct concept: migration-related identity fraud.
In a study on identity, Ricoeur distinguishes two different forms of identity: 
idem identity and ipse identity.7 The first, idem identity, refers to the sameness 
of (things or) persons. It is related to the term identical, meaning that a person 
at one time is the same person at another time. The latter, ipse identity, refers 
to the individual’s sense of self, or the idea of being unique.8 These two differ­
ent meanings of identity with references to either objective or subjective criteria
____________________________ Nijmegen Migration Law W orking Papers Series: 201 0/01
6 Koops et al. 2 0 09  and Vries et al. 2007.
7 Ricoeur 1990 & 1992, Hildebrandt 2 0 0 8 , Koops et al. 2009.
8 See, for instance, Benmayor & Skotnes (2001).
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of identification are a source of confusion. Within the context of this research 
we refer to the idem identity because the essential aspect of a procedure 
linked with migration is the verification of the sameness of a person.
Between 2004 and 2009 the FIDIS consortium9 did extensive research on 
‘identity’ and produced a number of reports including one on identity-related 
crime (ID-related crime).10 One of the main conclusions in 2005 was: ‘that there 
is no consensus on the exact phenomenon we are talking about and just what 
constitutes ID-related crimes’. In 2009 this conclusion was repeated: ‘commonly 
accepted definitions are lacking, thus blurring available statistics and poli­
cies’.11 This statement underlined once more the problematic character of our 
research, which we will elaborate upon in the next chapter.
A  major attempt to formulate proper definitions was made by another con­
sortium, PRIME.12 The terms and definitions formulated by PRIME in 2008 are 
understandably not yet commonly accepted.13 The problem however is that this 
attempt of standardization is not very likely to have the intended effect: a 
common terminology and an international overall approach. Although the ter­
minology itself might be defined within a consistent and complete topology, a 
more important issue remains, i.e. the different wordings and meaning within 
current legislation and existing case law in different countries. The differences 
in the provisions particularly in a number of identity-related laws and regula­
tions in different countries were made insightful by the Identity Law Survey pro­
ject, a project that unfortunately has not been continued.14
A comparative research on ‘identity fraud’ within the context of provisions 
in criminal codes of a number of countries was done by Vries et al. (2007).15 In 
their extensive report they conclude that identity fraud is a global problem 
connected with different forms of cross-border criminal behaviour such as hu­
9 FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society) is a NoE (Network of Excellence) sup­
ported by the European Union under the 6th Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development within the Information Society Technologies (1ST) priority 
< www.fides.net> .
10 FIDIS 2006.
11 Koops et al. (2009, p-20) also state within the context of identity-related crime that ‘the 
very nature of the issues at hand — crime, vulnerability, threats and hence fear — fuels an 
entire industry that benefits from inflating the terms and accompanying figures to p lay 
on public fears’.
12 PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe) is a research project supported by 
the European Union under the 6th Framework Programme and the Swiss Federal O ffice 
for Education and Science; zie: < www.prime-project.eu>.
13 PRIME 2008.
14 The Identity Law Survey is a project of the FIDIS network and provides a not yet com­
plete overview of identity-related laws and regulations, in the European Union and a se­
lection of non-EU countries, focussing on legislation related to official ID documents and 
ID fraud < id  ls.rechten.uvt.nl > .
15 The report of Vries et al (2007) analyzes provisions in The Netherlands, USA, UK, France 
Belgium and the European Union.
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man trafficking, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and terrorism. The report of 
Vries et al. also illustrates the rather loose usage of terms we indicated at the 
beginning of this chapter, such as (in)voluntary, (ir)regular and (il)legal. Fur­
thermore, it is noteworthy that the research by Vries et al. shows that even with­
in the jurisdiction of one state, fraud may have different connotations.
This means that fraud only becomes a relevant legal and predominantly 
but not necessarily criminal term if used as an adjective constructing a ‘fraudu­
lent act’. Subsequently, fraud is the means by which an act is caused to occur. 
At the same time, a fraudulent act may refer to both criminal and other non­
criminal acts like breaches of contract, offences or infractions. Thus, both crimi­
nal fraudulent acts and non-criminal fraudulent acts exist. The distinction be­
tween these two types of fraudulent acts, however, is not sharp. And to compli­
cate things further, fraudulent acts that fall within the scope of criminal fraudu­
lent acts in one jurisdiction, might be outside that scope in another jurisdiction.
From the previous it can be concluded that fraud as such is a container or 
catchall term, which is not very helpful in finding a clear meaning of the phe­
nomenon under study. Primarily, this has to do with the circumstance that the 
aforementioned literature on relevant terminology can be qualified as focused 
on a semantic level and a too large scale. If that is true, another approach 
might be useful: focussing on a pragmatic level in the context of migration.
2.3 A  pragm atic approach
2.3.1 Context of fraud
Fraud can be characterized as an intentional misrepresentation. The subsequent 
question however what is misrepresented and who is deceived by this mis­
representation can be answered in many different ways. And depending on 
these answers one ends up within civil, criminal or administrative law or no law 
at all.16 This research, however, is limited to the context of migration and the 
meaning of fraud should therefore be restricted to migration-related fraud.
2.3.2 Context of migration
Migration in the context of this research refers to border crossing: the move­
ment of an individual from one state to another. A  border between states rep­
resents the difference in jurisdiction and the applicability of different sets of 
rules. A  border therefore also implies the possibility of selecting who may enter 
or leave and who cannot.17 This selection process is, from a legal perspective,
____________________________ Nijmegen Migration Law W orking Papers Series: 201 0/01
16 This refers, for instance, to an ethical question not regulated by law.
17 The right to leave en re-enter one’s own country is formulated in the Universal Declara­
tion of Human Rights (UDHR) art. 13(2) and the International Covenant on Civil and Polit­
ical Rights (ICCPR) art. 12(2).
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essential for migration. Any kind of migration-related fraudulent act therefore 
has to be seen within this selection process of admission of individuals.
Assuming that the permission to leave or enter a state is conditional and at 
least depending on the possession of a travel document, the implementation of 
admission rules implies four phases:
1) the administrative process aiming at the issue of a travel document by a 
country to one of its nationals;
2) the administrative process aiming at the issue of a particular document by 
a country that allows entry into a particular country by a non-national;
3) the actual control of individuals and their travel documents at the border; 
and
4) the expiration of the conditions under which the permission to enter and 
stay in a country was granted.
The first phase enables an individual to travel, i.e. to leave his own country. In 
general, a passport or identity card enables this. Although a passport facili­
tates the holder of that document leaving and re-entering the country that is­
sued the passport, it does not automatically grant permission to enter another 
country.
A  number of countries request additional travel documents like a visa to 
enter the country, which entails the second phase. The issue of such a document 
can either take place outside the country of destination or at the border of the 
country of destination. Increasingly, the issue of such an additional travel docu­
ment implies a certain amount of time of investigation that cannot be per­
formed at the border.18 Subsequently, the request has to be made beforehand 
at a consulate or embassy of the country of destination.
The third phase takes place at the external borders of states, international 
airports and harbours. Within this phase the actual control of travel documents 
is performed and the actual admission to enter a country can be realized.19
The fourth phase, finally, marks the expiration of the permission to stay in a 
country. Monitoring this last phase is intrinsically difficult since it depends on the 
willingness of the foreigner to comply with the provision that his or her stay is 
no longer permitted.
Whereas the first three phases refer to the permission of the authorities of 
a country to enter and stay, the fourth phase refers to the ending of such a 
permission implying the obligation to leave the country. It also indicates that the 
first three phases refer to a number of distinct moments in time whereas the
1 8 The need for such additional visa primarily depends on the country of origin of the mi­
grant.
19 O r, in European context as a consequence of the Schengen agreement, to the European 
Union.
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fourth phase is a period that ‘only’ starts at the moment of expiration of validi­
ty of the travel document.
2.3.3 Context of identity
Migration-related fraudulent acts can be identified, although labelled differ­
ently, within the context of these four different phases of migration. Crucial el­
ement in this context is that an individual is authorized (or not) to enter a coun­
try, which implies that the concept of identity has to be taken into account. Most 
studies recognize that identity is a complex concept and that every individual 
has different identities, which are defined by context.20 Another w ay of formu­
lating this is to state that every individual has a unique set of attributes, which 
can be arranged in smaller subsets of attributes generating four types of iden­
tities:
a) attributed identity: attributes that are given to a person, usually at birth 
(such as name, date, place of birth);
b) biometric identity: attributes that are more or less unique to a person (such 
as iris, fingerprint, retina, DNA, gait, dynamic signature, keystroke behav­
iour);
c) biographical identity: attributes that build up over time (such as life events, 
details of education and qualifications); and
d) chosen identity: attributes that are chosen by a person (such as pseudo­
nym, nickname, username, artist or stage name).21
Any kind of fraudulent act in this context can be directed therefore at least at 
one of the aforementioned attributes that are part of an identity not belonging 
to the individual in question. As a consequence, an individual that intentionally 
unjustly claims to have at least one identity attribute that does not belong to his 
identity and does so within the context of migration, is culpable of migration- 
related identity fraud.
2.3.4 Context of migration-related identity fraud
The preceding implies that the controlling activity essential to the procedure 
linked to migration should focus on the verification of all identity attributes. 
That however, is seldom the case in practice. The actual controlling activity -  
mostly directed at the first and second type of identity attributes -  can be split 
into two stages:
1) the verification of an identity that an individual claims to have; and
____________________________ Nijmegen Migration Law W orking Papers Series: 201 0/01
20 Koops et al. 2 0 09  and Vries et al. 2007.
21 Koops et al. (2009) have extended the terminology from a UK study on identity fraud 
(Cabinet O ffice 2002).
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2) the authentication that the documents presented by an individual proves
this claim.
If and only if these two stages of verification and authentication are completed 
correctly, an individual can subsequently be authorized to enter a country. Thus, 
if the authorization is wrongful it must be caused by an undetected wrong at­
tribute within the verification stage or the authentication stage. It follows from 
the previous that the determination of the identity of an individual is crucial and 
that any intentional misrepresentation of any of the attributes of an identity 
falls within the meaning of migration-related identity fraud. Given the fact that 
identities are verified by authenticated documents, it is irrelevant to make a 
distinction between ‘migration-related document fraud’ and ‘migration-related 
identity fraud’.
As indicated above, several phases can be distinguished within the proce­
dure concerning the admission of an individual to a country. Subsequently, all 
these phases include moments in which identity fraud can be committed or de­
tected. Documents are therefore of vital importance and the detection of false 
or forged documents is of primary importance. This, however, does not mean 
that every kind of migration-related identity fraud always implies the presence 
of a forged or false document. Such a situation occurs if a passport, or an a d ­
ditional visa is issued by mistake or at false pretences, i.e. the agency that is­
sues the document has not recognized a misrepresentation of identity attributes 
that should have led to a refusal of the issue of the document, if recognized. 
Whenever such a mistake is made, at least one of the identity attributes falsely 
claimed by an individual, is ‘inserted’ into a travel document suggesting that 
the holder of the document is the ‘rightful owner’ of this particular identity at­
tribute. The action of this individual is fraudulent provided that the mis­
representation is intentional. The travel document, however, is genuine, not a 
forgery and therefore undetectable during border control.22
Next to the fraudulent acts by forgery of travel documents and a wrongful 
issue of a travel document a third type of migration-related identity fraud e x­
ists: the so-called look-alike identity fraud. In such a case someone who very 
much looks like the person to which the travel document has been issued, pre­
sents him or herself with the otherwise genuine travel document. This document 
is not forged or false nor is it issued at false pretences. It is ‘only’ used by an 
individual that falsely claims to have the identity that is mentioned in the travel 
document.23
22 Unless the wrongfulness of the issue of the travel document is detected, the validity is 
cancelled and the document is withdrawn.
23 The insertion of biometric identity attributes in travel documents could eliminate this type 
of identity fraud.
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Along with the detection of migration-related identity fraud during border 
control activities, just as much attention should be paid to prevent migration- 
related identity fraud by verifying all relevant identity attributes and the un­
derlying documents before a passport, identity card or a visa is issued.24
2.4 Asylum
The requirement of travel documents is essential within the context of migration. 
Only with a genuine travel document and the possible appropriate visa an in­
dividual may be authorized to enter a country. There is however one exception: 
in case of an asylum seeker. Individuals that claim asylum at the border of a 
country often do not have a genuine passport. Firstly, this has to do with the 
circumstance that in a number of countries where asylum seekers come from, the 
possession of a passport is unusual and the actual application for a passport 
may be suspicious. Such an application may attract a certain attention of the 
authorities that asylum seekers are actually trying to flee from. After all, asy­
lum seekers fear persecution from their authorities. Secondly, most (industrial­
ized) countries of destination for asylum seekers, maintain strict regulations for 
carriers regarding the transportation of undocumented aliens. This means that 
individuals without proper travel documents are not admitted by carriers be­
cause these carriers risk substantial penalties if they do. Recently, the European 
Commissioner for Human Rights stated: ‘Thus carriers’ sanctions may result in 
refugees being obliged to use the services of smugglers who provide them with 
false or forged documents in order to get around the vigilance of the carri­
ers’.25 So, the enforcement of carriers to ‘keep out’ individuals without proper 
travel documents, directly triggers the practice of migration-related identity 
fraud by asylum seekers.
This deficiency, however, should not be held against them according to ar­
ticle 31 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention), provided they are recognized as individuals in need of 
protection. Notwithstanding this ‘guarantee’ in the Refugee Convention, most 
asylum seeker receiving countries have regulations that do not ‘favour’ asylum 
seekers with false or forged travel documents.26
In essence, the intentional deception performed by asylum seekers is d i­
rected at the possibility of leaving their country of origin and seeking refuge in 
a country of destination deceiving the authorities of their own country, whereas
____________________________ Nijmegen Migration Law W orking Papers Series: 201 0/01
24 O r any other type of residence permit.
25 Commissioner for Human Rights (2010).
26 The Dutch Supreme Court (HR 1 3 October 2 0 09, LJN: Bll 325) for instance, decided that 
within the context of article 31 of the Refugee Convention it was incorrect to make a dis­
tinction between the possession of false documents and illegal entry or presence as the 
Court of A ppeal had done earlier (Hof Den Bosch 23 January 20 07, LJN:AZ7334)).
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all other migrants involved in migration-related identity fraud primarily try to 
deceive the authorities of a country of destination about their identity.
2.4.1 Terminological framework
From this perspective, it might be discussed whether migration-related identity 
fraud should be subdivided into (a) em/graf/on-related identity fraud and (b) 
/mm/graf/on-related identity fraud. The former is applicable to asylum seekers 
using forged or false documents; the latter is not. Emigration-related identity 
fraud by asylum seekers is only aimed at the intentional deception of the au­
thorities of the country they want to escape from. Immigration-related identity 
fraud, however, constitutes an intentional deception of the country of destina­
tion.
Based on the idea formulated in the Refugee Convention that the posses­
sion and usage of false or forged documents by asylum seekers should not be 
held against them, the consequence of this subdivision of migration-related 
identity fraud into em/graf/on-related and /mm/graf/on-related identity fraud 
has to be that emigration-related identity fraud by asylum seekers does not 
fall within the scope of the phenomenon under study.
This implies that controlling activities directed at migration-related identity 
fraud should make a sharp distinction between asylum seekers and all other 
migrants.27 Subsequently, any form of emigration-related identity fraud by 
asylum seekers should not be qualified as objectionable or categorized as an 
infringement of the law of the country of destination of the asylum seeker. It is 
pardonable.
2.5 Governm ental Fraud
So far, migration-related identity fraud committed by individuals was dis­
cussed. There is, however, a form of migration-related identity fraud that is 
committed by or on behalf of governments or governmental agencies. One of 
these manifestations can be found, of course, with secret services. An historic 
example is the action of the Mossad in 1960 by kidnapping war criminal Eich- 
mann in Argentina who was then smuggled out of the country dressed as an El 
Al official and brought to Israel.28
Another kind of migration-related identity fraud has nothing to do with se­
cret services. In January 2010 a German governmental agency was accused of 
deliberately using false documents. After investigation, a local German court 
decided that the extradition of a national of Sierra Leone was unlawful be­
cause the German agency that was responsible for the transportation of the
27 In a far wider context this relates to the discussion whether one of the essentials of fraud 
as such is the existence of a victim (Vries et al. 2007).
28 Bascomb (2009).
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alien did not acquire a genuine Emergency Travel Certificate from the Sierra 
Leone’s authorities but deliberately made use of forged documents.29
A third example is on the edge of personal and institutional fraud. In Feb­
ruary 2010 the director of the Bulgarian Migration Department of the Interior 
Ministry, was arrested because he had used his position to provide illegal assis­
tance to foreign citizens coming to Bulgaria. The director provided them with 
fake documents stating they had a permanent job in the country thus making 
them eligible for a permanent residence status.30 A  related example illustrating 
the possibility of making a business out of selling immigration papers is the con­
viction in February 2010 of a businesswoman by the State Supreme Court of 
New York (USA). The court ordered her to pay more than 2,8 million US dollars 
in restitution and penalties.31
Undoubtedly, these examples can be supplemented with numerous similar 
incidents or practices. The purport, however, is that migration-related identity 
fraud is not restricted to individuals or migrants. Evidently, it is an activity that 
is also applied by governments or governmental agencies and businesses, both 
secretly and overtly, publicly and privately.
Another unexpected side effect of certain policies to fight fraud was sig­
nalled in France. A  well-known French television and radio interviewer, Anne 
Sinclair, made it known to the media that she had been forced to produce end­
less series of documents to prove she was French, when simply renewing her 
identity cards, on the pretext ‘there was a lot of fraud’.32
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29 Verwaltungsgericht Bremen 9 January 2 0 10  (Az: 4V  1 30 6/0 9). The local agency is said 
to have paid for some 100 forged documents. The reason for this might have been sim­
ple: timesaving.
30 Sofia News Agency, 16 February 2 0 10, www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=l 1 3219.
31 Supreme Court of the State of New York, 25 February 2 0 10, casenr. 4 0 1 1 6 0 /2 0 0 9 . 
New York Times, City Room section, 1 March 2 0 10  <cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
201 0 /0 3 /0 1  /3-million-judgment-in-immigration-fraud-case/?scp=l &sq=3millionmigra- 
tion fraud&st=cse>.
32 Le Parisien 22 January 2 0 1 0 , Le Figaro, 22 January 2 0 10  and <annesinclair.type- 
pad .fr>.
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CHAPTER 3 COUNTRY RESULTS
In this chapter we will describe the results of our research concerning the state 
of affairs in a selection of countries. First of all, we will sketch a number of 
problems we encountered during our research, the way we tried to handle the­
se problems and the consequences we were confronted with. Also certain data 
on migration-related identity fraud are presented. Partially this information 
results from the questionnaire. Another important part originates from a study 
performed in 2007 by the International Centre for Migration Policy Develop­
ment (ICMPD in Vienna).
3.1 Problems
Soon after we had started making an inventory of relevant literature and for­
mulating the questions of the questionnaire, we ran into a serious problem. In 
short, our assumption that respondents should be found in academic circles a p ­
peared to be inaccurate.33 Although we contacted a number of academic e x­
perts at research centres familiar with the subject, the greater part of them 
declined our request to co-operate. Most common ground for this refusal was 
not the subject as such but the lack of data on the subject. To put in briefly, our 
experts were not aware of any relevant data. In fact, our search for relevant 
literature confirmed this. Although some reports indicated that some types of 
migration-related identity fraud did appear, the magnitude of these types 
could hardly be established. Meanwhile, the phenomenon was indicated as a 
serious problem suggesting that the scope had to be substantial. Nonetheless, 
we were unable to establish whether the number of actual migration-related 
identity fraud cases was of such an extent that the qualification ‘serious prob­
lem’ had to be issued.
Such a lack of data is not unusual -  criminologists, for example, are used to 
study a domain where dark numbers are predominantly present. Meanwhile, 
we were confronted with an increasing shortage of research time. In order to 
gather nonetheless as much relevant information as possible we shifted our fo­
cus and tried to locate possible respondents in other less academic but more 
practically oriented, governmental organisations. In most cases we arrived at 
highly specialized agencies responsible for a specific governmental task, such 
as border control or the inspection of false documents.
This methodological change implied three important consequences. The first 
was anticipated: a more detailed view by our respondents on certain processes 
linked to migration-related identity fraud combined with a lack of overview on 
the phenomenon itself. The second consequence was not expected. It turned out
33 This was also an explicit request of the ACV Z.
18
to be the case that all investigated countries had different approaches on mi­
gration-related identity fraud. Meaning, different infrastructures and combina­
tions of institutions, different competences and authorities, and different qualifi­
cations of infringements of regulations connected to criminal, civil or administra­
tive law. The third consequence was the most obvious one. While moving our 
attention from academic experts to practicing professionals, we were intro­
duced -  and had to introduce ourselves -  to all kinds of agencies that we were 
not familiar with. The patently obvious consequence of this was that most agen­
cies were not very eager to inform us about their activities, disclose their data 
or search for answers on our questions.
Merely because of the helpful assistance and mediation of other experts 
and our persistence to get results, we were able to reveal a certain limited 
amount of relevant information. Consequently we only succeeded in revealing 
some fragments of the larger picture. The closer we looked, the more detail we 
saw, but the less we got an actual overview in terms of comparable data. 
Moreover, the most common reaction from all our respondents was that we 
were looking for data that were not available or might even not exist.
3.2 ICMPD special Survey
During our search for relevant literature we came across a special survey per­
formed by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) 
and published in their 2006 Yearbook.34 This yearbook contains a very inter­
esting survey on counterfeit documents in Central and Eastern European coun­
tries. This special survey was a once-only report included in the annual reports 
issued by the ICMPD, the so-called Yearbooks on Illegal Migration, Human 
Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the possible reasons why this 
yearbook, and the special survey in particular, was not found as a reference in 
other literature could be that the ICMPD has mainly former Eastern bloc coun­
tries as Members States.35 Nevertheless, it contains valuable information. Alt­
hough not exactly covering the countries that are the topic of this preliminary 
CMR study, the data and information provided in these yearbooks and the 
special survey in particular form a valuable illustration for the phenomenon 
under study.
In particular the special survey of the ICMPD 2006 Yearbook is of im­
portance.36 It deals with Counterfeit Documents in Central and Eastern Europe
____________________________ Nijmegen Migration Law W orking Papers Series: 201 0/01
34 The ICMPD Yearbook (2006) includes a special survey on counterfeit documents in Cen­
tral and Eastern European countries.
35 Current Member States of the ICMPD: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hunga­
ry, Poland, Portugal, S lovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland.
36 Every ICMPD Yearbook includes a special survey on particular themes. Unfortunately, 
neither the 2008 Yearbook nor the 2 0 09  Yearbook were yet published during our re­
search.
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(CEE).37 The remainder of this paragraph is based on that survey. The data 
compiled in successive editions of the ICMPD Yearbook indicate that ever since 
the 2004 enlargement of the EU there has been a general downward trend of 
border apprehensions across the CEE region. Nevertheless it is acknowledged 
that a serious development over the past few years has been a widely ob­
served increase in the use of false or falsified documents for irregular m igra­
tion purposes.38 Such documents are often of high quality, suggesting the in­
volvement of professional criminal actors on a large scale.
3.2.1 Detection of counterfeit documents at CEE borders
In order to learn more about the misuse of documents on a regional level, the 
ICMPD decided to carry out a Special Survey that was distributed to Border 
Guard Services together with the standard questionnaire for the annual Year­
book of 2006. Based on these answers, a special chapter in the 2006 edition 
gave a regional overview and an analysis of patterns and trends in the use of 
counterfeit documents.
The ICMPD gives consideration to the fact that the numbers of irregular border 
crossings are dropping. One of these considerations is:
There is the strong possibility that there are fewer detected irregular border 
crossings not because there are necessarily so many fewer irregular migrants 
but because irregular migrants find other means of crossing borders that are 
at least quasi-regular. An example of this would be obtaining regular visas 
by misrepresenting the purpose of travel or residence (e.g. student visas, au 
pairs, business trips through fake invitations, overstaying tourist visas, sham 
marriages, etc.) or through corruption and bribery. (Recent visa-scandals in 
Western embassies across the region and globally provide some hints on such 
phenomena of irregular migration which, strictly speaking, do not involve il­
legal border crossings and do thus not result in border apprehensions).39
In their report the ICMPD uses the following definitions.40
There are a number of ways in which documents can be fraudulently used for 
illegal migration purposes. Some documents may be complete counterfeits 
and others may be forged or falsified, while yet others may be authentic doc­
uments but used by somebody else. In this chapter, the general terms ‘use of
37 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 35-56.
38 Interestingly, the Yearbook 2 0 06  contains in its title ‘illega l’ migration, whereas the sur­
vey uses both the term ‘irregular’ and ‘illega l’ migration without indicating the difference.
39 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 17.
40 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 35.
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false or falsified documents’ or ‘use of counterfeit documents’ refer to the 
fraudulent use of travel documents for the purposes o f illegal migration and 
illegal border crossing. The following more detailed terminology will also be 
used in this chapter:
1. False documents (complete counterfeits).
2. Falsified documents (original documents changed ex post).
3. Forged documents (also called ‘camouflage’ documents, these are counter­
feit documents that have no originals as such or look different from the orig i­
nals).
4. Fantasy documents (documents from countries/organisations that do not 
exist).
5. Impersonation (use of authentic documents by somebody else).
6. Fraudulent acquisition (e.g. by theft, corruption, use of sham data).
Subsequently, the ICMPD notes that statistics are subject to problems of inter­
pretation. In particular, the level of skills and specialized equipment of border 
guards and police officers has an important influence on the capacity of law 
enforcement personnel to detect counterfeit documents in the first place. The 
quality of falsifications is often very high and access to accurate and timely 
information on the latest trends in the ways and means of counterfeiting travel 
documents is crucial and may not be available in equal measure at all times 
and in all places.
For example, Hungary which typically records the highest number of coun­
terfeit documents (mainly falsifications of visas and residence permits) in 2006 
registered a 7 0 %  decrease of visa and residence permit falsifications and at­
tributes this development to the regularization of some 510,000 irregular mi­
grants in Italy. A  large part of regularized persons were Ukrainians working in 
Italy, who had previously transited through Hungary. As a result the number of 
detected falsifications of Italian residence permits in Hungary decreased d ra­
matically without, however, implying a permanent downward trend of the use 
of counterfeit documents. The ICMPD discerns that using the numbers of legal 
border crossings the incidence of identified false or falsified documents among 
all recorded cross border movements varies widely among countries in the CEE 
region. Nevertheless, in general it is exceedingly small. On average only 10 
cases of using counterfeit documents per 1 million legal border crossings are 
detected.41
The countries the ICMPD study covers are: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. These countries in 
fact cover the whole eastern border of Europe from Finland to Turkey. The
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41 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 39.
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large majority of counterfeit documents are detected at official road border 
crossings (61%  in 2006), while only around 15%  was detected at airports. A 
further 7 %  was detected at railway border crossings (often inside trains) and 
5 %  at the green borders. Inland controls made up 11 %  of detections, while the 
sea borders accounted for less than 1 %  of all detections across the region.42
Looking at the types of document falsifications or document abuses detect­
ed across the CEE region, we can see that -  in the aggregate -  it was mainly 
document falsifications (by various methods, see further below) that were regis­
tered by the border guards. Document falsifications made up 5 0%  of all coun­
terfeiting, while the use of false documents, i.e. complete counterfeits, made up 
2 0%  of all detected cases. Impersonation (use of authentic documents by 
somebody else) made up a further 14%  of cases, while other types of docu­
ment abuse were far less common.
With regard to the organisational structures and inter-agency cooperation 
it emerges that most responding States have a special unit for intelligence 
gathering and analysis for the fight against counterfeit documents within the 
State Border Guard administration.43 Also, the CEE States are cooperating in­
ternationally against the use of counterfeit documents. For EU Member States 
the standards and exchange of intelligence information with their counterparts 
in other EU countries are of paramount importance for the development of their 
capacities to fight the use of counterfeit documents. All the more strange that, 
with the exception of Austria, Switzerland and Portugal, none of the (other) old 
EU Member States participate within the ICMPD. Next to the ICMPD, the most 
important European platforms for collaboration and exchange on counterfeit 
documents are:
The Working Group for Border Issues (FRONT) of the Council of the Euro­
pean Union.
The Working Group on False Documentation (FAUXDOC) of the Council of 
the European Union.
Meetings, seminars, working groups and trainings organized by Frontex.44 
The False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO) of the Council of the 
European Union and its Users Working Group (FUG).
Frontex coordinates operational cooperation between Member States in the 
field of the management of external borders and assists Member States in the 
training of national border guards, including the establishment of common
42 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 0 6 , p. 40. This ratio of 10 per million seems to be confirmed by 
data represented in reports of the Australian border service agency
43 See for an illustration of these agencies, 0, a reprint of the table in ICMPD Yearbook 
2 0 06, p. 48.
44 Frontex is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders (based in W arsaw).
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training standards on counterfeit documents. Training programmes on counter­
feit documents are designed to fulfil the standards of the EU for the m anage­
ment of external borders.
Apart from EU programmes, special training courses are carried out in co­
operation with bilateral partners and international organisations. For example, 
in Cyprus the USA Embassy in Nicosia, the UK High Commission in Athens and 
the Embassy of The Netherlands in Amman organize special seminars for the 
recognition of falsified travel documents.45
3.2.2 Relevance of the ICMPD survey to Western Europe
From this interesting and relevant survey at least two conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, as far as anything can be said about the magnitude of migration- 
related identity fraud in the CEE region, the volume seems to be very small: 
only 10 out of every million legal border crossings appears to be done using 
counterfeit documents. The ICMPD Yearbook 2006 states that the number of 
legal border crossings within 15 Central and Eastern European countries, i.e. 
entries only, varies between 600 million in 2002 and 650 million in 2006.46
O f course, this small fraction of 10 per million can also be interpreted the 
other way around, meaning that most border agencies in CEE countries are not 
equipped with sufficient tools to detect a larger part. There are, however, at 
this moment no additional data available of other years that might indicate 
whatever interpretation is correct. However, data from a completely different 
part of the world, i.e. Australia, suggest that a similar ratio is applicable to 
Australia.47 Data from the Canadian Border Service Agency indicate that the 
ratio for Canada could be around 40 (per million).48
Secondly, an assumption can be made about the volume of migration- 
related identity fraud in Western-European countries. This assumption is based 
on the hypothesis that the larger part of migration flows towards Western Eu­
rope occurs over land. If so, the volume of migration-related identity fraud that 
can be detected each and every time a land border is crossed further to the 
West, must be decreasing. In other words, if the border control agencies of 15 
CEE countries succeeded in 2006 in detecting some 1 2,000 counterfeit docu­
ments at their land, sea and air borders,49 it is unlikely that a far greater num­
ber should be detected at the external borders, i.e. mainly airports of Western 
European countries.
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45 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 49.
46 ‘Adding the number of registered exits (which are, however, often undercounted com­
pared to entries), the total number of legal border crossings in these 15 countries com­
bined in 2006 was about 1.28 billion’ (ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 1 9).
47  See Australian Border 2005 and Australian Border 2009.
48 Canada Report 2009
49 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 38.
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3.3 The availab ility  and com parability of data
Our initial selection of countries to investigate comprised (along with the Euro­
pean Commission): Belgium, France, Germany, the UK, Sweden, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Australia and Canada.
As we indicated in the previous paragraph, we were unable within the re­
stricted period of time to get in touch with the appropriate experts in all of 
these countries. And as far as we did, a number of these experts were unable 
to answer our questions or needed at least another month or so to find out 
whether the data we were looking for actually existed.
This resulted into a tripartition of the countries under study: (a) non­
responding countries, (b) partially responding countries and (c) fully responding 
countries. The first category refers to countries in which we were unable to lo­
cate experts that were able or allowed to provide relevant information on our 
subject. This category includes the Czech Republic and Australia. So far as the­
se countries are concerned we could only find relevant information in the earli­
er mentioned special survey of the ICMPD50 (for the Czech Republic) and the 
website of the Australian Immigration Department51.
The second category refers to countries in which we were able to gather 
some relevant information, although this was primarily done by personal com­
munication and only partially supported by documentation. This category in­
cludes the UK, Canada, France and the European Commission. In the UK and 
Canada we were able to get in touch with experts within the governmental 
border agencies.52 These experts, however, had to ask permission of their su­
periors which implied such delays that the larger part of the requested infor­
mation could not be delivered in due course. Our French contact, however, 
could not, in spite of her efforts, get hold of the relevant information and final­
ly had to refer us to the possibility of writing to the Minister of Immigration -  a 
procedure that could easily have taken at least six months. An official of the 
European Commission stated that the information we were interested in was 
simply not available at the level of the European Commission. Nevertheless, he 
confirmed that migration-related identity fraud was a serious problem alt­
hough he could not provide us with any data whatsoever.
The third category refers to the countries that were able and allowed to 
provide us both with documentation and answers to our questionnaire. Howev­
er, even within this category a general tendency emerged that most of our 
questions were unanswerable. This category includes Germany, Belgium, Bul­
garia  and Sweden.
50 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 35-56.
51 Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship < www.immi.gov.au>.
52 The Canadian Border Service Agency and the UK Border Agency.
24
Before we will summarize the data of the selected countries in the following 
paragraphs, we would like to make a remark on the incomparability of the 
data. As indicated above, the lack of a coherent set of definitions concerning 
migration-related identity fraud leads to a situation that the available statistics 
are difficult to interpret. Sometimes a certain term, such as fraud, is used 
whereas different meanings are referred to. The opposite also goes where one 
particular phenomenon is indicated but named in various ways, which is the 
case with immigration marriage fraud, marriage fraud, marriage of conven­
ience, bogus marriage or sham marriage.
Another example of the incomparability of data has to do with the follow­
ing. The indication of fraudulent, counterfeit or false documentation linked to 
migration can have a very wide or narrow range depending on whether one or 
more of the following situations are in- or excluded: (1) the actual use of 
forged or false documents (2) impersonation using genuine documents (3) the 
actual use of forged airline tickets (4) the allegation of trying to apply for a 
visa on the basis of possible bogus supporting documents (5) allegations relat­
ed to contrived marriages (6) the cancellation of a visa due to a criminal back­
ground (7) overstaying or other breaches of visa conditions (8) illegal work or 
(9) human trafficking. Next to these differences of seldom distinguished sepa­
rate categories the available statistics are often unclear whether the events 
were detected at road borders, rail borders, green or land borders, sea bor­
ders and airports or just ‘at the border’. Also, certain statistics do not make a 
distinction between m/granf-related and m/graf/on-related and include in their 
data on migration related identity fraud also data of apprehended non­
nationals at traffic controls.53
3.4 Finality of data
It goes without saying that figures and statistics only represent a situation at a 
given moment in time. Almost always a notice is added indicating that the fig ­
ures may differ from other, earlier statistics, due to for example administrative 
revisions. Statistics may include, for instance, cases that are under revision or in 
appeal. However, it becomes rather troublesome when only figures are in­
cluded that indicate suspicious situations omitting the number of finalized cases.
This applies for instance to ‘marriages of convenience’ or ‘contrived mar­
riages’.54 As far as this category of suspicious marriages is mentioned, the sta­
tistics do not state the number of marriages that are actually proven to be ‘con­
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53 See, for instance French Report 2009.
54 Examples of this can be found in the Australian publications (Australian Border 2005, 
Chapter 12) < www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/compliance/managing-the- 
border/pdf/m tb-chapterl 2 .p d f>  and in the Belgian official report (Belgian Report 
2 0 08, p. 83).
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trived marriages’ -  or whatever disqualifying label is attached. Precisely by 
only mentioning the volume of suspicious cases the impression cannot be avoid­
ed that the larger part will be finalized as being a marriage that has solely 
has been contracted for the purpose of obtaining a legal and secure status in 
the country of immigration. However, research indicates that only in a small 
number of cases, i.e. a one-digit percentage, the marriage is declared invalid. 
Apparently, evidence in this type of cases is very difficult to produce.55 A  simi­
lar example of this can be found in year reports of governmental agencies 
where the actual workload of referred cases is presented as a measure for the 
proven cases.56
The reason why this example of suspicious marriages is mentioned, is two­
fold. Firstly, it is the only category we came across that is treated in this way. 
Secondly, the question arises why the qualification suspicious marriage is only 
mentioned within the context of migration.
3.5 Data of selected countries
Our intention was to obtain data in a number of ways: through personal com­
munication, a questionnaire and from statistical overviews in reports, yearbooks 
or publications on websites. As indicated above, we regrettably experienced a 
setback in the realization of this plan.57 The moment we almost met our d ead ­
line, we had to come to the conclusion that out of ten countries (including the 
European Commission) we had received no more than four completed question­
naires.58 Regarding the other six countries, we had only gathered general in­
formation. Furthermore, even the completed questionnaires show that little can 
be said about the magnitude of the phenomenon under study.59 Although this 
could argue the case to rearrange our research in order to take a longer time 
frame into consideration, we had to meet our schedule. Due to this lack of com­
prehensiveness, we are unable to present comparable data along the lines of 
the questionnaire.60 However, we would like to indicate a few matters that are 
at least worth mentioning.
55 Hart 2006.
56 Belgian Report 2008.
57  The short time period of our research made it impossible to contact other countries anew.
58 Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria and Sweden.
59 Although an alternative point of view could be presented implying that this type of in­
formation is classified.
60 The questionnaire (0) contained a series of questions related to: (1) the processing of 
travel documents (including visa and residence permits), (2) the number of fraudulent re­
quests or detected cases of migration-related identity fraud, (3) the inclusion of identity 
attributes in these documents, (4) the regulation of migration-related identity fraud, (5) 
the presence of a national fraud desk, (6) the associated policies and finally (7) trends 
or practical problems.
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One of the subjects that is underlined by our respondents and emerges 
from the literature is that much more attention has to be paid to the training of 
personnel responsible for the actual control of travel documents and especially 
of supporting documents.
The ICMPD survey on counterfeit documents presented an interesting ratio: 
‘the incidence of identified false of falsified documents among all recorded 
cross-border movements’.61 As mentioned, for the CEE region this ratio was in 
2006 on average 10 per million. One might say that such a (low) ratio has to 
do with either a lack of staff or the know-how to detect counterfeit documents. 
However, it is interesting to investigate whether other countries in sometimes 
completely different situations have comparable ratios. In order to do so, we 
must elaborate on the notion of border crossings.
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country y e a r number of rec­
orded  border 
crossings (entries 
only) in millions
number of d e ­
tected counterfeit 
documents
ratio of detected 
counterfeited 
documents per 
million border 
crossings (entries 
only)
CEE region 2 0 0 6 6 5 5 1 2 .0 0 0 18
B u lgaria 2 0 0 6 12 4 0 5 34
B ulgaria 2 0 0 8 10* 106 1 1
B u lgaria 2 0 0 9 10* 159 16
A ustralia 2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 5 * * 1 1 2 0 7 19
A ustralia 2 0 0 7 -2 0 0 8 * * 13 143 1 1
C a n a d a 2 0 0 7 -2 0 0 8 * * 5 0 1913 38
* estim ated value 
** fiscal y e a r  indication
source: own e laboratio n  of ICM PD 2 0 0 6  Survey, d a ta  from the questionnaire and other publications
The ICMPD survey mentions a ratio of 1 0 per million border crossings if one 
counts entries as well as exits. The countries we would like to compare with 
specify the number of detected counterfeit documents in the context of immi­
gration, i.e. entries only. Taking that into account, the ratio for the CEE region 
comes to 1 8 per million border crossings (entries only). For Bulgaria this means 
a ratio of 34 in 2006, 11 in 2008 and 16 in 2009. Remarkably, the ratio for 
Australia was in their fiscal year 2004-2005 under 20 and in 2007-2008 
around 1 1.62 Canadian documentation indicates a ratio of 38 in 2007-2008.63
61 ICMPD Yearbook 2 0 06, p. 39.
62 In 2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 5  a total of 20 7  cases of fraud were detected during immigration control 
on a total of 11 million entries. In 20 0 7 -2 0 8  this number was 143 on a total of 1 3 mil­
lion entries (Australian Border 2005 & 2009).
63 In 2 0 0 7 -2 0 0 8  191 3 cases of (immigration) fraud are listed on a total of some 50 million 
entries (Canada 2009).
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The UK has no data published on this issue, only mentioning that around 30.000 
people were refused entry in 2008 of which only a small part is refused on 
grounds related to identity fraud.64
It has to be underlined that these ratios, varying between 10 and 40 per 
million entries, are based on a very rough calculation. Nonetheless, it indicates 
further research on the question whether this ratio of detected cases of m igra­
tion-related identity fraud on border control could be valid for other countries 
as well.
64 UK Immigration 2008. If 10%  would have been refused because of identity fraud, the 
ratio for the UK would have been around 30.
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSIONS
This comparative research is based on the request by the Dutch A CV Z to inves­
tigate the state of affairs on migration-related identity fraud in a number of 
countries outside The Netherlands aiming at gaining an insight into possible pol­
icy options for the Dutch situation.
The first part of our research is meant to examine the terminology that is 
used to describe the phenomenon under study: migration-related identity fraud. 
The second part focuses on the actual size of instances of our subject enabling 
us to answer the question whether there is a problem and if so what the magni­
tude is thereof. This second part also includes an effort to reflect on policy op­
tions.
4.1 Term inological outcome
Our search for and analysis of the relevant terminology started with the pre­
ferred description of the ACVZ: ‘document and identity fraud within the context 
of admission and residence of aliens’. This description, however, turned out to 
be inadequate. Consequently, we stipulated that the phenomenon had to be 
reformulated in the concept of ‘migration-related identity fraud’. At the same 
time, we found that this concept could not be traced within the available litera­
ture and that the expressions that were used were highly ambiguous.
This has to do with the circumstance that the term fraud as such is a con­
tainer or catchall term applied to numerous types of behaviour in which inten­
tional deception is central and is differently qualified depending on the con­
text. Also, the constitutive elements of fraud differ widely and depend on the 
particular context of the behaviour and the subsequent legal qualification in 
different jurisdictions. In addition, a more restricted concept of identity fraud is 
used along with other phrases or expressions such as impersonation, identity 
theft and document fraud whereas these wordings are not clearly defined.
Although the available literature shows that a coherent and consistent to­
pology might be formulated in theory, current practice shows that various kinds 
of wordings are firmly fixed in case law and different forms of legislation are 
not consistent with each other.65 An example can be found in the apparently 
easy way in which identity theft and identity fraud are used interchangeably. 
One of the key issues in this example is that the concept of identity theft -  alt­
hough present in the American Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act -  
is impossible: one cannot steal an identity. At most, it is possible to state that 
one can misuse the identity of someone else. After all, the individual whose
65 FIDIS 2 0 06, Vries et al. 2 0 07, PRIME 2008 and Koops et al. 2009.
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identity is misused has not lost his own identity, as would be the case if it would 
be possible to steal an identity.66
The inevitable consequence of this ambiguity on the terminology is that the 
available statistics are very difficult to interpret. Our efforts to gather compa­
rable data more or less ended up into a collection not only of apples, oranges 
and peaches but a whole basket of fruit describing different and sometimes 
overlapping parts of the phenomenon under study. The differences in legal 
jargon in several countries also led to the conclusion that certain behaviour in 
one country that could be described as an orange was labelled as a peach in 
another.
4.2 Practical outcome
W e started off the practical part of our research by selecting a number of 
countries inside and outside the EU on which we intended to gather additional 
information. Throughout our research we discovered not only that the terminol­
ogy was unclear but also that we could not find any academic colleagues that 
were able to throw light on the issue at hand in these countries. A  general re­
sponse from academic circles was that we were looking for data that probably 
were not there, and if they did exist they might be classified.
As a result we shifted our attention to non-academic practicing profession­
als mainly working within the area of border agencies and counterfeit docu­
ment examination centres. Locating these specialists was an even more time- 
consuming effort that frequently led to a situation in which the management of 
these agencies was hesitant in granting permission to their employees to coop­
erate within our research. This led to serious delays and put severe pressure on 
our very restricted time schedule. As a consequence we were not able to get 
relevant information on all the countries we initially selected. And of those 
countries we did obtain relevant data, we could not always get answers on all 
our questions.
In short, the previously mentioned conclusions that the terminology on the 
subject of migration-related identity fraud is ambiguous and that the relevant 
statistics are either unavailable or difficult to interpret have to be extended 
with the conclusion that we could not generate a general comparable overview. 
W e can, however, elaborate on certain fragments of the picture that might be 
useful within the framework of making policy choices.
66 Essentially, this terminological discussion is identical to the question whether it is possible 
to steal data or information (quod non).
30
4.3 Policy options
The first issue we want to discuss is the point of international cooperation and 
exchange of information on migration-related identity fraud. On our search for 
relevant literature we came across a very interesting survey on the detection of 
counterfeit documents at the border of Central and Eastern European countries. 
This survey published by the ICMPD in 2007 contained valuable information on 
parts of the subject of this study. However, we could not find any references to 
this survey in the available literature. Although the ICMPD aims at promoting 
‘innovative, comprehensive and sustainable migration policies and to function as 
a service exchange mechanism for governments and organisations’, it has only 
15 Member States which, with the exception of Portugal, are all located at the 
eastern border of Europe.67 It might be useful if the intergovernmental d ia ­
logue on the issue of migration in general and migration-related identity fraud 
in particular with the ICMPD was extended to other European Union Member 
States, including The Netherlands.
A  second issue is the hypothesis that identity fraud and migration-related 
identity fraud in particular could be fought successfully using more technology 
implying the use and storage of digital data. Although the presence of digital 
data in travel documents ensures an increase in the possibility of verifying bio­
metric identities, it is also demonstrated that exactly the use of centralized 
storage of identity data increasingly facilitates the occurrence of identity 
fraud.68 From that perspective one may have doubts about the effectiveness of 
the plans to introduce centralized storage of identity data used for the inclusion 
of biometric identity attributes in passports.
A  third issue concerns the question whether migration-related identity fraud 
has to be labelled as a problem. Our investigation shows that a sensible dis­
tinction can be made in the area of migration between asylum seekers on the 
one hand and all other migrants on the other hand resulting in the distinction 
between em/graf/on-related identity fraud and /mm/graf/on-related identity 
fraud. The former manifests itself in particular with asylum seekers who are 
more or less forced to use counterfeit documents to flee their country of origin. 
This, however, is excusable. The latter, immigration-related identity fraud forms 
the actual scope of the problem. Although exact numbers are missing it is only 
rational to state that the actual size of migration-related identity fraud is re­
duced if emigration-related identity fraud by asylum seekers is left aside. Alt­
hough we could only gather a small amount of information on the actual size of 
migration-related identity fraud, it seems that the actual number of migration- 
related identity fraud cases is very small. The ICMPD survey presented an
____________________________ Nijmegen Migration Law W orking Papers Series: 201 0/01
67 About the ICMPD <ICM PD.org/whatisicmpd.html>.
68 Koops et al. 2009.
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overall average of 10 counterfeited documents on every million legal border 
crossings. O f course this ratio of 1 0 per million reflects only the number of de­
tected documents. However, governmental publications of other countries, such 
as Australia, Canada and the UK suggest a ratio varying between 5 and 40 
per million. Thus, it could be the case that the actual number of migration- 
related identity fraud cases that occurs during Dutch border crossing is not 
alarming.
The fourth and final issue is the occurrence of migration-related identity 
fraud using genuine documents. If we exclude the look-alike cases, it seems 
plausible to state that a substantial number of these cases could only occur be­
cause of a lack of care at the phase of issuing a travel document. It might be 
the case that a substantial increase of attention to the verification of supporting 
documents could substantially decrease the number of migration-related identi­
ty fraud cases using genuine documents.
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APPENDIX 1 QUESTIONNAIRE
O ur questionnaire contained the fo llo w in g  questions:
1) G ene ra l
a) W h a t is you r name?
b) W h e re  a re  you w orking?
c) W h a t is you function?
2) Residence Perm it
Defin ition: in this questionnaire w e de fine  a residence perm it as any document (including visa) tha t 
a llow s an a lien to  en te r o r s tay  in you r country fo r  a certa in period  o f tim e o r inde fin ite .
W e  do re fe r  to  a ll kinds o f immigrants, including asylum seekers.
a) How m any requests fo r  residence perm its did you r country receive (p e r y e a r  in the period  
2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 9 )?
b) W h a t is the a ve ra g e  processing tim e o f such a request?
c) W h a t is the price?
d) How m any requests fo r  residence perm its a re  re jected (per y e a r in the period  2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 9 )?
e) W hich o rg an iza tion  is responsible fo r  processing these requests and the issue o f residence 
permits?
f) A re  the re  any records kep t abou t fraud u len t requests?
If so:
• W h a t a re  the main reasons fo r  fraud u len t requests?
• Could you describe the d iffe re n t form s (modus operand i) o f fraud u len t requests?
• How m any requests fo r  residence perm its a re  q u a lif ie d  a t firs t sight as possibly fra u d u ­
lent (per y e a r in the period  2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 9 )?
• How m any requests fo r  residence perm its tha t a re  q u a lif ie d  a t firs t sight as possibly 
fraud u len t and fu rth e r investigated , a re  lab e lle d  as fraud u len t (per y e a r  in the period  
2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 9 )?
g) In case o f fraud :
• W h a t a re  the consequences fo r  the a lien?
• W h a t kinds o f sanctions a re  put into practice?
• Is there  a sep a ra te  act on id en tity  or document fraud ?
• W hich o rg an iza tion  carries out (and keeps track o f) these sanctions?
h) A re  the fo llo w in g  d a ta  included in a residence perm it? 
please answ er w ith: yes — no — (or) on ly if ...
• name
• d a te  o f b irth
• place and country o f b irth
• sex
• na tio n a lity
• issuing governm enta l o rg an iza tion
• lega l ground fo r  perm it
• photograph
• fingerp rin ts
• o ther (b iom etric) d a ta , such as: ................
3) Regulation o f fra u d  in the context o f the requests fo r  residence permits,
a) W h a t types o f rules a re  ap p licab le?  (civil, crim inal o r adm in is tra tive)
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b) W h o  ac tua lly  app lies these rules?
c) Could you g ive  references fo r  these rules (if possible, both in tra d itio n a l form  and as an in te r­
net reference)?
d) W hich en tity  m ay le g a lly  change these rules?
e) Do these rules have a m eaning in practice?
4) N a tio n a l 'Fraud Desk’
a) Is there  (something like) a (nationa l) 'Fraud Desk’ present in you r country and if so, w ha t is the 
actual name and address o f this Desk?
b) W h a t a re  the tasks o f this Desk?
c) W h a t is the au th o rity  o f this Desk? (i.e. is it w e ll respected fo r  its expertise)
d) W h o  is a llow e d  to consult this Desk?
e) W h a t kind o f d a ta  does this Desk collect?
f) W h a t measures a re  taken to  protect the p rivacy o f reg iste red  persons?
5) Accountab ility
a) W h o  is (or a re ) p o litic a lly  responsible fo r  carry ing  out the policy on Fraud? (ministers o r vice- 
ministers)
b) Is Fraud seen as a (po litica l) p rob lem ?
c) W h a t measures (policies) a re  taken to  tackle this (po litica l) p rob lem ?
6) Trends
a) Could you describe certa in trends in the actual occurrence o f (m ig ra tion  re la te d ) fraud ?
7) Problem in practice
a) W h a t is seen as the most crucial problem  re la te d  to  Fraud?
b) Is the problem  addressed, and if so by whom?
c) W h a t kind o f analyses has been m ade o f this problem ?
d) W h a t a re  the remedies or solutions tha t have been suggested?
e) W hich remedies or solutions have been im plem ented?
f) W h a t is done in terms o f prevention?
g) Is p rivacy seen - in this context - as an obstacle?
h) Is this problem  seen as a na tiona l o r an in te rna tiona l problem ?
8) Your opinion
Is there  anyth ing  else re la te d  to  this research you would  like to  bring to  our a ttention?
37
Grütters & Zwaan: Migration-related Identity Fraud
APPENDIX 2 COUNTERFEIT AGENCIES IN CEE COUNTRIES
O rganisational arrangement of the fight against counterfeit documents 
in selected Central and Eastern European Countries
C ountry S p ecial unit or units d e a lin g  w ith co u n ­
terfeit docu m ents w ith in  the Border 
G u a rd s
Other institutions/departm ents d e a lin g  
w ith  docu m ent security
Croatia • Department for Analysis and Devel­
opment
•
Cyprus • Crime Analysis O ffice  of the Police 
Headquarters
• N ational Security Authority (N SA)
Czech Republic •
•
Unit on Documents 
A nalytical and O perational Unit
•
Estonia • Analysis Section of Intelligence De­
partment
• Estonian Citizenship and Migration 
Boa rd
Hungary • Documentation Division of the Border 
M anagem ent Department N EKO R
• Institute of Experts of the Sp ec ia l Service 
of N ational Security
• N ational H Q  of the Police, Crim e Direc­
torate
• Crim inal Expert and Research Institution
Kosovo • Specia l Intelligence Unit under estab­
lishment
•
Latvia • Specia l Intelligence Unit under estab­
lishment
• State Forensic Science Bureau at the 
Ministry of Justice
• Departments within the Ministry of the 
Interior
Lithuania • Document Examination Centre • Service of Technological Security of the 
Ministry of Finance
• Lithuanian Police Forensic Science Centre 
of the Ministry of Interior
• Forensic Science Centre of the Ministry 
of Justices
Poland • Criminal Analysis Unit within the Intel­
ligence and Investigation Department
• Central Crim inological Laboratory of the 
Headquarters of the Police
• Crim inological Laboratory • Department of Technical Assistance of
• Strategic Analyses Bureau the Internal Security A gency
• Laboratory of Research and Develop­
ment Centre of Polish Security Printings 
W orks
• Department of Crim inology of Adam  
Mickiewicz University in Poznan
Romania • Risk Analysis Unit with subordinated 
regional compartments
• N ational Institute for Personal Data 
Records at the Romanian Police
• N ational Institute for Forensic Expertise 
at the Ministry of Justice
Serb ia • Section for Criminal Intelligence A f ­
fairs
•
Slovak Republic • - • N ational Unit for the Fight Against Ille­
g a l M igration at the Ministry of Interior
Slovenia • Slovenian Border Police • Police
• Ministry of Interior
Ukraine • Department of Passport Control a t the 
State Border G uard  Service
• N ational Criminal Research Centre of 
the Ministry of Interior
• Criminal Analysis Unit of the National 
Border M anagem ent Services
• Regional Criminal Research Units
Source: IC M PD  Yearbook 2 0 0 6 ,  p. 4 8 .
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